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1. Introduction 
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) (2003), the Department 
of the Treasury (1999) and others view the recent wave of corporate accounting 
frauds and corporate tax shelters as being partly attributable to U.S. financial 
reporting standards and U.S. tax law being too rules-based.  This has given rise to the 
current debate regarding whether U.S. financial reporting standards should be more 
principles-based.1 A “rules versus principles” debate regarding U.S. tax law has been 
underway for decades (Colliton 1995).   
When promulgating standards, policymakers need to consider how varying 
levels of standard precision would affect the behavior of the standards’ users (Mason 
and Gibbins 1991; Nelson et al. 2002).2 Thus, of relevance to the “rules versus 
principles” debate is how the precision of standards interacts with accountants’ 
psychological characteristics and their professional environment, including the 
potential economic consequences of their decisions.  A psychological characteristic 
of accountants found to be relevant to their judgment is their cognitive style (Fuller 
                                                 
1 In section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes”), the SEC was directed to “. . . 
conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial reporting system of a principles-based 
accounting system” (Sarbanes 2002).  In October 2002 the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”) issued a proposal to consider the feasibility of adopting a principles-based approach for 
U.S. standard setting similar to that used in International Accounting Standards (FASB 2002).  In 
March 2003 the American Accounting Association (“AAA”) Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee (“AAA Committee”) stated that it strongly supports the commitment by the FASB to 
evaluate the feasibility of principles-based standards (Maines et al. 2003).  In July 2003 the SEC 
issued its report as directed by Sarbanes (SEC 2003). 
2 In a 1994 paper Dennis Beresford, then FASB Chairman, called for research to assist in setting 
accounting standards in situations such as the current “rules versus principles” debate.  Beresford 
stated that, while it is useful to understand the behavioral implications of existing standards, it is 
perhaps even more useful to evaluate the potential behavioral implications of a standard before its 
implementation (Beresford 1994). 
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and Kaplan 2004; Ho and Rodgers 1993).3 A potential economic consequence of 
accountants’ decisions found to be relevant to their judgment is the potential 
applicability of professional penalties (Anderson and Cuccia 2000; Roberts 1998). 
This study examined the effect on accountants’ judgment and decision 
making of their cognitive style and the severity of potential professional penalties 
under standards of varying precision (i.e. rules-based versus principles-based 
standards) in the context of client pressure to support an “aggressive transaction”.  
Herein, “aggressive transaction” refers to a transaction that may comply with the 
literal text of standards but nonetheless violate standards because, for example, it is 
devoid of economic substance.  A key aim of those who advocate more principles-
based standards is to discourage such transactions (Department of the Treasury 1999; 
FASB 2002; Joint Committee on Taxation 2002; SEC 2003).  Study participants (62 
Certified Public Accountants) were asked to indicate whether in exchange for a 
lucrative fee they would provide a written opinion stating that an aggressive 
transaction would be upheld if challenged by the pertinent regulatory authority 
(“approve an aggressive transaction”).  Their cognitive styles were measured using 
the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator scales for the Perceiving (SN) mental function, 
Judging (TF) mental function and Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude.4 
Study results indicate that Thinking (T) (the Judging [TF] mental function 
preference of over 70% of accountants) accountants may be more willing than 
                                                 
3 Ho and Rodgers (1993) calls for more research regarding the effect of accountants’ cognitive 
characteristics and states that understanding such effect should lead to improving accountants’ 
judgment. 
4 The Perceiving (SN) mental function, Judging (TF) mental function and Judging-Perceiving (JP) 
attitude are discussed in section 2.2.2. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Feeling (F) accountants to approve an aggressive transaction under rules-based but 
not under principles-based standards.  Study results also indicate that this differential 
effect may be enhanced if an accountant is a Sensor (S) and a Judging (J) type as 
well as a Thinker (T) (“STJ”).  Nearly 40% of accountants are STJs.  Surprisingly, 
study results indicate that increasing the monetary amount of potential professional 
penalties may not lower, and may even heighten, the willingness of accountants to 
approve an aggressive transaction under either rules-based or principles-based 
standards.  These results may be of interest to policymakers who aim to promulgate 
standards that result in consistent and not overly aggressive application by 
accountants. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides 
background, reviews related literature and sets forth expected study results.  Section 
3 outlines the study research method.  Section 4 presents the study results.  Section 5 
discusses certain study weaknesses.  Section 6 provides concluding comments. 
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2. Background, Literature Review and Expected Study Results 
2.1 Rules-based versus principles-based standards 
 
A law requiring drivers to stop at a red light is rules-based, while a law 
requiring drivers to proceed cautiously through a blinking yellow light is principles-
based.  Rules-based standards establish legal boundaries based on the presence or 
absence of well-specified triggering facts (e.g. did the car stop?).  These standards 
are clear and easy to follow, are applied without regard to the substance of results but 
only with regard to the standard’s terms, and are opaque to the standard’s intent and 
purpose.  Principles-based standards require evaluation by considering facts in light 
of one or more general questions (e.g. how fast was the car going, what were the 
weather, road and traffic conditions, and how much danger should the law tolerate?).  
These standards are vague, are substantive, and are transparent to the standard’s 
intent and purpose (Huhn 2003; Korobkin 2000; Sullivan 1992). 
In accounting “rules versus principles” represents a continuum ranging from 
unequivocally rigid standards on one end to general definitions of economics-based 
concepts on the other end (Maines et al. 2003).  An example of unequivocally rigid 
standards is “[a]nnual depreciation expense for all fixed assets is to be 10 percent of 
the original cost of the asset until the asset is fully depreciated”.  An example of 
general definitions of economics-based concepts is “[d]epreciation expense for the 
reporting period should reflect the decline in the economic value of the asset over the 
period” (Maines et al. 2003, p. 74).   
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 Both U.S. financial reporting standards (SEC 2003) and U.S. tax law 
(Department of the Treasury 1999) contain voluminous standards of varying 
precision.  Most of these standards are very specific and are considered rules-based, 
e.g. scope and treatment exceptions and detailed implementation guidance in U.S. 
financial reporting standards (Schipper 2003) and most of the Internal Revenue Code 
and Treasury Regulations in U.S. tax law (Department of the Treasury 1999).  
However, some of the standards are less specific and are considered principles-based 
(Joint Committee on Taxation 2002; SEC 2003).  U.S. financial reporting standards 
are under-girded by the FASB’s Conceptual Framework (Schipper 2003) and U.S. 
tax law is overlaid by legislative, regulatory and judicial doctrines that potentially 
override a literal interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury 
Regulations when such interpretation would produce unintended or inappropriate 
results (Department of the Treasury 1999).5   
Studies indicate that accountants do not always interpret and apply either 
rules-based or principles-based standards as intended by standard setters.  Standards 
with too few rules and vague, imprecise provisions may be interpreted inconsistently 
and reduce comparability between financial reports.  However, standards with too 
                                                 
5 For example, with respect to U.S. financial reporting standards, the SEC, the FASB, and the AAA 
Committee have all stated that the economic substance, not the form, of a transaction should guide 
financial reporting (FASB 2002; Maines et al. 2003; SEC 2003).  In tax the economic substance 
doctrine becomes applicable when a taxpayer seeks to claim tax benefits unintended by Congress by 
means of transactions that serve no economic purpose other than tax savings (ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner U.S. Tax Court 1997; Department of the Treasury 1999). The economic substance 
doctrine has been a principal weapon in recent Internal Revenue Service attempts to thwart corporate 
tax shelters.  Most tax lawyers assume the validity of the economic substance doctrine (New York 
State Bar 2003).  However, some aggressive tax lawyers do not (Madison 2003). 
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many rules may give rise to complexity that hampers mental processing (Nelson 
2003).   
Nelson et al. (2002) and Spilker et al. (1999) indicate that both auditors and 
tax professionals are more aggressive under low precision standards in unstructured 
contexts (transactions not intentionally planned and entered into by management or 
taxpayers)6 but are more aggressive under high precision standards in structured 
contexts (transactions intentionally planned and entered into by management or 
taxpayers).7 Nelson et al. (2002) reports the results of a field-based questionnaire to 
elicit auditors’ recollections of specific incidents when managers attempted to 
manage earnings.  In the context of unstructured earnings management transactions, 
auditors were significantly more likely to require adjustments under high precision 
(62%) versus low precision (39%) standards.  In the context of structured earnings 
management transactions, auditors were significantly less likely to require 
adjustments under high precision (15%) versus low precision (33%) standards.  
Spilker et al. (1999) reports the results of an experiment in which the 
recommendations of tax professionals to clients regarding transactions were 
examined under different standard specificities (precise or ambiguous) and different 
                                                 
6 Likewise, audit partners were more likely to allow a client's income-increasing accounting treatment 
in cases governed by a less precise standard (Trompeter 1994) and auditors were less likely to allow 
extraordinary treatment under a new standard requiring explicitly that extraordinary items be of a 
nonrecurring nature (Hronsky and Houghton 2001). 
7 Nelson et al. (2002) looked to theory from law and economics that provides that when applying 
imprecise standards people assess high exposure to error costs because adjudication is unpredictable 
(Shavell 1987) and may react by being more careful to comply with the spirit of the rule (Kessler and 
McClellan 1996).  This theory also provides that people may be more willing to incur costs to 
structure transactions to evade legal norms when standards are precise because structuring is more 
likely to significantly reduce exposure to error costs under precise standards (Gifford 1971; Kaplow 
1992). 
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decision contexts (unstructured compliance or structured planning).8 In the 
unstructured compliance context, tax professionals were less likely to recommend an 
aggressive tax position under precise (2.33 on 7-point scale) versus ambiguous (4.22 
on 7-point scale) standards, while in the structured planning context tax professionals 
were more likely to recommend an aggressive tax position under precise (4.71 on 7-
point scale) versus ambiguous (3.08 on 7-point scale) standards. 
 
2.2 Cognitive style9 
2.2.1 Accountants’ judgment and cognitive characteristics 
Accountants’ judgment in both audit (Bonner and Pennington 1991; Libby et 
al. 2002; Libby and Luft 1993; Pincus 1990) and tax (Marchant et al. 1989; Roberts 
1998; Shields et al. 1995) is typically viewed as the product of individual 
accountants and the task environment.  One relevant aspect of individual accountants 
is their cognitive characteristics, which encompass cognitive style, cognitive ability 
and cognitive strategy (Ho and Rodgers 1993; Kagan and Kogan 1970).10   
                                                 
8 Unlike auditors, tax professionals have a duty to be advocates for their clients (AICPA 2000).  
However, tax professionals have a duty to not recommend a tax return position unless they have a 
good-faith belief that the position has a realistic possibility of being sustained administratively or 
judicially on its merits if challenged (AICPA 2000). 
9 In this study, “cognitive style” refers to the combination of an individual’s Perceiving (SN) mental 
function, Judging (TF) mental function and Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude as measured by the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. 
10 Cognitive ability relates to knowledge encoding and retrieval and is concerned with level of skill.  
Cognitive strategy pertains to the interactions among an individual’s cognitive styles, cognitive 
abilities and the environment (Ho and Rodgers 1993). 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Cognitive style pertains to the preferred methods of acquiring and processing 
information during the problem-solving process and entails “distinctive ways of 
acquiring, storing, retrieving, and transforming information” (Ho and Rodgers 1993, 
p. 103).  Unlike cognitive ability and cognitive strategy, cognitive style measures do 
not involve labels that imply one style is better than another.  Analogous to right-
handed versus left-handed, cognitive style is consistent over time, not easily 
modified, and not influenced by situational factors within a normal range of 
conditions (Ho and Rodgers 1993).  Although cognitive ability has been the focus of 
most accounting studies examining the effect of accountants’ cognitive 
characteristics,11studies that have examined the effect of accountants’ cognitive 
styles on their judgment generally indicate it to be significant (Fuller and Kaplan 
2004; Ho and Rodgers 1993).12 
 
2.2.2 Jungian theory and cognitive style  
 
 According to Jung (1921), much of the apparently random variation in human 
behavior is actually a consistent and orderly result of basic observable differences 
between the way individuals prefer to make perceptions and judgments.  Jungian 
theory (Jung 1921) continues to be an important influence in psychology and shares 
                                                 
11 For example, see Bonner et al. (1990) and Libby and Tan (1994) with respect to auditors and 
Bonner et al. (1992) and Spilker (1995) with respect to tax professionals.  With respect to 
interpretation of accounting standards, in Patel and Day (1996) the field-dependence versus field-
independence (Witkin et al. 1971) of Australian business students affected their ability to interpret an 
Australian accounting pronouncement. 
12 Studies that have examined the effect of accountants’ cognitive styles on their judgment have 
operationalized cognitive style as (1) simple versus complex, (2) adaptor versus innovator (measured 
by Kirton’s [1987] index), (3) field-dependence versus field-independence (measured by Witkin et 
al.'s [1971] Embedded Figures Test) or (4) analytic versus intuitive (measured by the Myers-Briggs 
Type Indicator [Myers et al. 2003]) but have predominately used the latter two measures (Fuller and 
Kaplan 2004).   
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many concerns and features with cognitive science (Wheeler 2001).  Jungian Theory 
is operationalized using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (“MBTI”).13 
In Jungian theory, there are two bipolar mental functions regarding the way 
individuals perceive and form judgments about the world: Perceiving (SN) and 
Judging (TF).  Jung’s Perceiving (SN) mental function refers to the way a person 
determines what a problem or situation entails and involves all the ways of becoming 
aware of things, people, happenings, or ideas and encompasses information 
gathering, the seeking of sensation or of inspiration, and the selection of a stimulus 
to attend to when solving a problem (Ho and Rodgers 1993; Myers and Myers 1995; 
Myers et al. 2003; Wheeler et al. 2004a).  Sensors (S) tend to focus on immediate 
experiences and tend toward enjoyment of the present moment, realism, acute 
powers of observation, memory for the details of both past and present experiences, 
and practicality.  They tend to be realistic and practical and are good at remembering 
and working with a large number of facts (Ho and Rodgers 1993; Myers and Myers 
1995; Myers et al. 2003; Wheeler et al. 2004a).  Intuitors (N) tend to focus on 
possibilities, meanings and relations by way of insight and tend toward the 
imaginative, theoretical and abstract.  They tend to look at the big picture and try to 
grasp the essential patterns (Ho and Rodgers 1993; Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et 
al. 2003; Wheeler et al. 2004a).  In sum, Sensors (S) tend toward the concrete and 
                                                 
13 Wheeler et al. (2004a and 2004b) provides that the MBTI has three comparative strengths relative 
to other personality measures with respect to accounting information systems research.  First, 
researchers have extensively tested the validity and reliability of the MBTI over approximately four 
decades.  Second, the MBTI is grounded within a comprehensive psychology of personality.  Third, 
the MBTI is well suited for research examining the relation of cognition and information processing 
to personality.  The two most recent located studies that examine the effect of accountants’ cognitive 
styles on their judgment (Cheng et al. 2003; Fuller and Kaplan 2004) used the MBTI. 
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details and tend to focus on individual elements and concrete facts and figures, while 
Intuitors (N) tend toward the theoretical and abstract and tend to perceive problems 
as a whole (Wheeler et al. 2004a). 
Jung’s Judging (TF) mental function is a processing function that transforms 
data provided by the Perceiving (SN) mental function in order to decide what action 
will be taken to solve a problem or resolve a situation.  It encompasses evaluation, 
choice, decision-making and the selection of a response after perceiving a stimulus.  
Thinkers (T) tend to decide on the basis of potential logical consequences and rely 
on impartiality and neutrality with respect to the personal desires and values of both 
themselves and the people who may be affected by the decision.   Feelers (F) tend to 
decide primarily on the basis of personal or social values and try to anticipate and 
take into account the effects of the decision at hand on the people involved (Ho and 
Rodgers 1993; Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003; Wheeler et al. 2004a).  
For example, when deciding which of five employees to promote to supervisor, 
Thinkers (T) would likely develop a set of explicit criteria and rank the criteria as to 
importance and then rate the five employees accordingly, while Feelers (F) would 
likely focus on job qualifications including impact on other workers and the personal 
circumstances of the five employees and then determine if any candidate stood out 
clearly from this weighing of values (Myers et al. 2003). 
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In Jungian theory, there are two bipolar attitudes that reflect an individual’s 
fundamental views of the world: Extraversion-Introversion (EI) and Judging-
Perceiving (JP).  Jung’s Extraversion-Introversion (EI) attitude pertains to whether 
one’s attention is primarily directed at the external world of people and objects or the 
inner, subjective world of body and mind (Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 
2003). 
Jung’s Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude pertains to one’s attitudes or 
orientations toward dealing with the outside world.  Judging (J) types prefer the 
decisiveness and closure that results from dealing with the outer world using the 
Judging (TF) mental functions.  Perceiving (P) types prefer the flexibility and 
spontaneity that results from dealing with the outer world using the Perceiving (SN) 
mental functions (Myers et al. 2003).  In any new activity, it is appropriate first to 
use the Perceiving (SN) mental functions to observe or take in the situation; then it is 
appropriate to use the Judging (TF) mental functions to decide on the appropriate 
action.  Perceiving (P) types typically remain longer in the observing attitude 
because it is more comfortable and natural for them.  They will often suspend 
judgment to take another look and stay attuned to incoming information.  Their aim 
is to receive information as long as possible in an effort to miss nothing that might be 
important.  Judging (J) types move more quickly through perception in order to reach 
conclusions and achieve closure, as they are most comfortable and satisfied when a 
plan has been developed or when a decision has been made.  They tend to shut off 
perception as soon as they have observed enough to make a decision.  They are 
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concerned with making decisions, seeking closure, planning operations and 
organizing activities (Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003).         
 Because people develop greater comfort and facility with their preferred 
mental functions and attitudes, individuals with different preferred mental functions 
and attitudes should differ in their information processing, judgment, learning and 
communicating (Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003).  However, non-
preferred mental functions and attitudes are still present in the personality, and 
individuals may be quite competent using them.  For example, an Intuitor (N) may 
find that using their non-preferred Sensing (S) ability is the most effective way of 
handling important financial records (Myers et al. 2003).  Once preferred mental 
functions and attitudes are allowed to adequately develop to dominance, a general 
goal of development is to use each mental function and attitude for the tasks for 
which they are best fitted (Myers et al. 2003). 
 The mental functions and attitudes and cognitive style of the study 
participants, accountants and the general U.S. population are presented in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 The mental functions and attitudes interact to form the personality.  Because 
of this interactive effect, a mental function or attitude in one type may have a 
different effect on the personality than the same mental function or attitude in 
another type (Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003).  Combinations with a 
common mental function or attitude will share some qualities, but each combination 
has qualities all its own (Myers and Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003).  
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 The most common combination for accountants (39.1%) of the Perceiving 
(SN) mental function, the Judging (TF) mental function and the Judging-Perceiving 
(JP) attitude (herein “cognitive style”) is Sensing-Thinking-Judging (STJ) (Kovar et 
al. 2003).  Individuals with an STJ cognitive style are well suited to many of the 
tasks performed by accountants (Myers and Myers 1995).  Kovar et al. (2003, p. 92) 
posits that the STJ cognitive style “may be something of a minimum requirement to 
successfully perform the tasks required by accountants” and observes that “the 
accountant’s primary strength, whether in public or private practice, remains 
collecting actual information from the events in a business (an inherently sensing [S] 
function) creating logical categorizations and aggregations (an inherently thinking 
[T] function) and finding ways to communicate it in an organized fashion and to use 
it to facilitate effective decisions (a function requiring an individual focused on 
judging [J])”. 
 
2.3 Prior studies examining the effect of Jungian cognitive style on 
accounting-related decisions14 
 
 Casey (1980) examined the effect of the Perceiving (SN) mental function of 
46 loan officers when analyzing three consecutive years of financial ratios for 30 
firms and predicting which of the firms would file for bankruptcy within the 
subsequent three-year period.  Intuitive (N) loan officers outperformed Sensing (S) 
                                                 
14 Rodgers and Housel (1987) proposes a two-stage cognitive process model for decision-making.  
During the first stage, the decision maker uses their perceptual processes to acquire and filter 
information.  During the second stage, the decision maker uses their judgmental processes as they 
make inferences based on filtered information and reference information in long-term memory to 
arrive at a decision.  Several studies (e.g. Casey 1980; Cheng et al. 2003; Chenhall and Morris 1991; 
Rodgers and Housel 1987) have focused only on the effect of decision makers’ Perceiving (SN) 
mental function on their judgment.  Such studies implicitly assume that the Perceiving (SN) mental 
function affects judgment by determining what information is evaluated in judgmental processes.  
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loan officers, which Casey (1980) attributed to Intuitive (N) loan officers having a 
greater aptitude to perceive and understand the implications of the levels, trends, and 
trade-offs between the financial ratios provided. However, in Rodgers and Housel 
(1987), which examined the effect of the Perceiving (SN) mental function of 50 loan 
officers and 59 MBA students when making loan decisions, Sensing (S) loan officers 
outperformed Intuitive (N) loan officers.15 Ho and Rodgers (1993) attempts to 
reconcile the results in Casey (1980) and Rodgers and Housel (1987) by pointing out 
that Rodgers and Housel (1987) did not provide participants with economic and 
management information, thereby removing the comparative advantage lntuitors (N) 
have in using this type of information to recognize performance patterns.16     
Chenhall and Morris (1991) examined the effect of the Perceiving (SN) 
mental function of 64 middle- to senior-level managers when performing a resource-
allocation task.  It was expected that Intuitive (N) managers would focus on broader 
consequences and consider the information holistically and thus be more likely to 
identify the opportunity costs associated with various types of expenditures.  As 
expected, Intuitive (N) managers tended to incorporate opportunity costs in their 
resource-allocation decisions, while Sensing (S) managers tended not to identify the 
opportunity-cost implications.17  
                                                 
15 There was no significant difference in the performance on the task of the Sensing (S) MBA students 
and the Intuitive (N) MBA students. 
16 Rodgers and Housel (1987) posits that their results differed from Casey (1980) because the task in 
Casey (1980) only pertained to the first stage of their two-stage cognitive process model. 
17 The introduction of project sponsorship (whether managers supervised the project) moderated the 
influence of cognitive style. 
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 Vassen et al. (1993) examined the effect of the Perceiving (SN) mental 
function and Judging (TF) mental function of 25 experienced (5-39 years auditing 
experience) auditors from the three largest public accounting firms in The 
Netherlands.  With respect to “information acquisition”, Sensing (S) auditors 
accessed more information than did Intuitive (N) auditors.  With respect to 
“information processing”, Thinking (T) auditors took longer to process the 
information accessed and had a lower tolerance for ambiguity than did Feeling (F) 
auditors. 
Cheng et al. (2003) examined the effect of the Perceiving (SN) mental 
function of students in third-year management accounting.  The 48 (of 271) students 
with the highest Sensing (S) scores and the 46 (of 271) students with the highest 
Intuitive (N) scores were selected.  After controlling for task conflict, results showed 
significantly better decision performance for Sensing (S)/Intuitive (N) pairs over 
Sensing (S)/Sensing (S) pairs but not over Intuitive (N)/Intuitive (N) pairs. 
Fuller and Kaplan (2004) examined whether the cognitive styles of 44 Big 6 
audit seniors significantly interacted with task type to affect performance.  Building 
upon the work of Chan (1996), the study examined the role of “cognitive misfit” on 
auditor task performance.  Chan’s (1996) cognitive misfit framework posits that task 
performance will be better where there is a match between cognitive style and task 
attributes and will suffer when there is a mismatch between cognitive style and task 
attributes.  Participants performed two judgment tasks, one analytic and one 
intuitive, and completed the MBTI.  The analytic task required participants to review 
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workpapers prepared by a staff auditor.  The intuitive task required participants to 
perform an analytic review of pre-report financials.  Sensing-Thinking (ST) auditors 
performed better on the analytic task than the intuitive task, while Intuitive-Feeling 
(NF) auditors performed better on the intuitive task than on the analytic task.18 
 
2.4 Expected effect of accountants’ cognitive styles under rules-based versus 
 principles-based standards19 
 
 Rules-based standards require a decision maker to answer clear questions 
such as “what is 10 percent of the original cost of the asset?” while focusing on well-
specified triggering facts and the literal text of standards.  Principles-based standards 
require a decision maker to answer vague questions such as “what was the decline in 
the economic value of the asset over the period?” while focusing on facts in a holistic 
fashion in light of standards’ substantive intent and purpose (Huhn 2003; Korobkin 
2000; Maines et al. 2003; Sullivan 1992).   
The aggressive transactions that have given rise to the “rules versus 
principles” debate have typically arisen in contexts in which applicable standards 
consist of abstract principles-based provisions on top of which have accreted bright-
line rules-based provisions (Colliton 1995; Department of the Treasury 1999; Nelson 
2003; SEC 2003).  The aggressive transactions typically comply with the accreted 
bright-line rules-based provisions but do not comply with the abstract principles-
                                                 
18 The remaining two cognitive styles, Sensing-Feeling (SF) and Intuitive-Thinking (NT), were 
collapsed together and termed “hybrid” for purposes of the study. 
19 Because it is not possible to construct rules-based standards and principles-based standards for 
which identical stringency is assured, the aggressiveness of accountants’ decision-making under rules-
based versus principles-based standards was explored as part of the study, but no formal hypotheses 
regarding the relation were proposed. 
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based provisions (Department of the Treasury 1999; SEC 2003).  The intent and 
purpose of the applicable standards is typically apparent in the abstract principles-
based provisions but not in the accreted bright-line rules-based provisions (Huhn 
2003).  Current proposals to move to more principles-based standards would remove 
accreted bright-line rules-based provisions from standards, leaving only the abstract 
principles-based provisions (Department of the Treasury 1999; SEC 2003).     
I expected that Intuitive (N) accountants would be more likely than Sensing 
(S) accountants to recognize that aggressive transactions do not comply with 
applicable standards and thus would be less aggressive than Sensing (S) accountants 
in their decision-making related to such transactions.  I expected Sensing (S) 
accountants to focus on the bright-line rules-based provisions with which aggressive 
transactions do comply and to ground their judgment on the individual concrete facts 
pertaining to such provisions and thus to be less cognizant that an aggressive 
transaction does not comply with relevant standards.  In contrast, I expected Intuitive 
(N) accountants to focus on the abstract principles-based provisions with which 
aggressive transactions do not comply and to ground their judgment on the holistic 
information needed to recognize that aggressive transactions do not comply with 
relevant standards.  I expected this effect to be greater under rules-based standards 
(than under principles-based standards) because the bright-line rules-based 
provisions with which aggressive transactions do comply would serve as a focal 
point for Sensors (S) and direct their attention to individual concrete facts.  
Accordingly, my Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c were:   
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H1a: If an aggressive transaction complies with rules-based provisions but does 
not comply with principles-based provisions, Intuitive (N) accountants will 
be less aggressive than Sensing (S) accountants in their decision-making 
related to such transaction. 
 
H1b: If there are no applicable rules-based provisions and an aggressive 
transaction does not comply with principles-based provisions, Intuitive (N) 
accountants will be less aggressive than Sensing (S) accountants in their 
decision-making related to such transaction. 
 
H1c: The degree to which Intuitive (N) accountants are less aggressive than 
Sensing (S) accountants in decision-making related to an aggressive 
transaction that does not comply with principles-based provisions will be 
greater when rules-based provisions (with which the transaction does 
comply) are applicable in addition to principles-based provisions. 
 
 
2.5 Professional penalties and their expected effect under rules-based versus 
principles-based standards and their expected interaction with 
accountants’ cognitive styles 
 
 The willingness of both auditors (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996) and tax 
professionals (Roberts 1998) to support aggressive, client-preferred positions is 
affected by their incentives, including potential professional penalties (Anderson and 
Cuccia 2000; Roberts 1998).  However, because accountants may receive a 
psychological reward from beating the Internal Revenue Service or other tax agency, 
increasing professional penalties can cause accountants to increase their effort and 
produce a backlash effect (Cuccia 1994). 
 Commentators have noted (Department of the Treasury 1999; Nelson 2003) 
and studies indicate (Cuccia et al. 1995)20that efforts to discourage accountants from 
                                                 
20 Cuccia et al. (1995) investigated whether replacing a professional standard that employs a vague, 
verbal disclosure threshold with a professional standard that employs a more stringent, numerical 
threshold mitigates the aggressiveness of reporting decisions.  Results indicate that (1) when a verbal 
professional standard is in place, tax practitioners use the latitude inherent in the standard to support 
aggressive reporting decisions, and (2) when a numerical professional standard is in place, tax 
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supporting aggressive transactions by varying the precision of standards may prove 
ineffective unless they are coupled with appropriate changes in relevant incentives 
(Department of the Treasury 1999; Nelson 2003).  Nelson (2003) posits that 
changing the balance of incentives should have a greater effect on accountants’ 
judgment under imprecise (i.e. principles-based) standards than under precise (i.e. 
rules-based) standards.  This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that 
accountants use the flexibility inherent in standards to allow reporting favored by 
their incentives (Cuccia et al. 1995; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Libby et al. 
2002; Roberts 1998).   
 I expected that under principles-based (i.e. imprecise) standards if potential 
professional penalties were low (high) accountants would be more (less) likely to use 
the flexibility inherent in such standards to justify supporting aggressive transactions.  
I expected the presence of bright-line rules-based provisions with which an 
aggressive transaction does comply to reduce the effect of the severity of potential 
professional penalties.  This is because accountants may perceive that compliance 
with the bright-line rules-based provisions suffices to shield them from professional 
penalties.  I expected this to be especially true with respect to accountants who are 
not cognizant that an aggressive transaction does not comply with also applicable 
principles-based provisions (i.e. Sensors [S] as opposed to Intuitors [N]) and/or are 
more focused on the logical consequences of supporting the aggressive transaction 
                                                                                                                                          
practitioners instead use the latitude available in assessing evidential support to justify an aggressive 
reporting decision.  This shift in incentive effect is pronounced enough to render reporting decisions 
made under the numerical professional standard as aggressive as reporting decisions made under the 
verbal professional standard. 
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(Thinkers [T] as opposed to Feelers [F]).  When accountants perceive less chance of 
the applicability of professional penalties, the effect of the severity thereof should be 
reduced.  Accordingly, my Hypotheses 2, 3a and 3b were:   
H2: When aggressive transactions do not comply with principles-based 
provisions, the effect of increasing the severity of potential professional 
penalties will be greater when no rules-based provisions (with which the 
transaction does comply) are applicable.  
 
H3a: Increasing the severity of potential professional penalties will have a greater 
effect on the aggressiveness of Sensing (S) accountants than on the 
aggressiveness of Intuitive (N) accountants. 
 
H3b: Increasing the severity of potential professional penalties will have a greater 
effect on the aggressiveness of Thinking (T) accountants than on the 
aggressiveness of Feeling (F) accountants. 
 
 
3. Study Research Method 
3.1 Study Participants 
The 62 participants were members of the Oklahoma Society of Certified 
Public Accountants (“OSCPA”).  Demographic statistics for the participants are 
presented in Table 2.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
3.2 Study design 
 The study used a 2 (manipulated rules-based versus principles-based 
standards condition) x 2 (manipulated low potential professional penalty versus high 
potential professional penalty condition) between-subjects design together with 
participants’ measured Sensing (S) versus Intuitive (N), Thinking (T) versus Feeling 
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(F) and Judging (J) versus Perceiving (P) measured preferences and whether or not 
the participant was indicated as having a Sensing-Thinking-Judging (STJ) cognitive 
style. 
 
3.3 Study procedure 
The OSCPA provided a list of the names and addresses of the 2,016 of their 
members self-identified as being in public practice, 1,702 of which self-identified 
their area of practice as tax.  The list was organized by zip code.  For purposes of 
randomization, I sequentially numbered each participant using a repeating “1 2 3 4, 1 
2 3 4, etc.” pattern and then sorted using this numbering.  I assigned participants to 
the four conditions using this sorting number.  A letter on university letterhead was 
forwarded to each of the 2,016 asking for their participation in the study.  Forty-two 
participants responded to the initial letter.  Approximately six weeks later a postcard 
was forward to each of the 2,016 asking again for their participation in the study.  
Twenty participants responded to the postcard.21  
Data were collected using four websites, one for each condition.  Participants 
were directed to one of the websites.  Upon reaching the website, they read an 
informed consent form and indicated whether they wished to proceed.  If they 
wished to proceed, participants clicked a link to a separate webpage containing the 
study instrument, which is described in section 3.4.  After completing the study 
instrument, participants clicked a link to a separate webpage containing the study 
                                                 
21 Results did not differ significantly between the 42 participants who responded to the initial letter 
and the 20 participants who responded to the postcard (p < .1355) and there was no significant 
interaction with RvP (p < .7795) or PENALTY (p < .4994). 
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questionnaire.  The study questionnaire asked manipulation checks, questions related 
to the study instrument, questions related to the control variables, and demographic 
questions.22 After completing the study questionnaire, participants clicked a link to a 
separate website.  This website is the commercial website for CPP, Inc., the 
providers of the MBTI.  Participants completed the MBTI at this website.  The letter 
forwarded to the OSCPA members and the study websites informed participants that, 
if they wished to be entered into a drawing for a cash prize of $100 and/or they 
wished to obtain their MBTI results, they could forward an email to me at my 
University of Oklahoma email address.23 
 
                                                 
22 A copy of the study instrument and study questionnaire is attached in Appendix A. 
23 One participant who forwarded an email requesting to be entered into the drawing for a cash prize 
of $100 was selected at random and awarded the cash prize.  I forwarded their MBTI results to all 
participants who so requested. 
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3.4 Study instrument 
As did Cuccia et al. (1995), I used a tax context to examine issues related to 
standard precision.  Although financial accounting and tax differ in important ways, 
the effect of accountants’ psychological characteristics and potential economic 
consequences such as professional penalties should generalize across the two realms 
(Nelson 2003). 
Participants were presented with a scenario in which an insurance company 
client wishes to engage in an aggressive transaction plan to reduce its state insurance 
gross premiums tax (“plan”).  Under such a tax, insurers pay a tax equal to a 
percentage of gross premiums received with respect to business done in a state 
(Commerce Clearing House 2004).  This infrequently encountered tax practice topic 
was chosen to minimize the potential effects of prior participant knowledge.  Only 
four participants indicated prior experience with the study scenario topic, and only 
one participant indicated that such experience entailed more than 3 occurrences.  
Mythical tax provisions were also used to minimize the potential effects of prior 
participant knowledge. 
In the scenario, the client wishes to lower its gross premiums tax with respect 
to employee group health insurance plans by having employers (rather than the 
insurance company client) “pay” employee claims for up to 80% of the actuarially 
predicted monthly mean level of aggregate employee claims, thus lowering the 
amount of premiums “received” by the client.  In an actual case involving a 
materially less aggressive plan of this type, the Supreme Court of California 
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concluded that in economic substance the employers were mere agents of the 
insurance company for collection of employee premiums, not independent insurers, 
and thus held the insurance company taxable on the sum of the premium payments it 
received from the employers and the pre-trigger point claims paid from employer 
funds during the years in question (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. State 
Board of Equalization  Supreme Court of California 1982).  To minimize the 
potential effects of social influences such as pressure from firm superiors, the 
scenario asked participants to assume that they practice as the sole owner of a small 
accounting firm. 
 
3.5 Dependent variable 
 For the dependent variable (“AGGRESSIVE”), participants were asked to 
indicate using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale whether in exchange for a 
lucrative fee they would provide a written opinion stating that the “plan” would be 
upheld if challenged by the pertinent regulatory authority (“approve an aggressive 
transaction”). 
 
3.6 Independent variables 
The first independent variable (“RvP”) is a manipulated dichotomous 
variable pertaining to whether participants were assigned to the rules-based standards 
(“rules”) condition or the principles-based standards (“principles”) condition.  In the 
rules condition, applicable standards were comprised of bright-line rules-based 
provisions with which the aggressive transaction did comply and abstract principles-
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based provisions with which the aggressive transaction did not comply.  In the 
principles condition, applicable standards were comprised only of abstract 
principles-based provisions with which the aggressive transaction did not comply.     
 The second independent variable (“SN”) is a continuous variable pertaining 
to participants’ Sensing (S) versus Intuitive (N) Perceiving mental function 
preference (range from -30 for Sensing [S] to +30 for Intuitive [N]).  The third 
independent variable (“TF”) is a continuous variable pertaining to participants’ 
Thinking (T) versus Feeling (F) Judging mental function preference (range from -30 
for Thinking [T] to +30 for Feeling [F]).  An additional continuous independent 
variable (“JP”) pertaining to participants’ Judging (J) versus Perceiving (P) attitudes 
or orientations toward dealing with the outside world (range from -30 for Judging [J] 
to +30 for Perceiving [P]) was examined in the further analysis.  A dichotomous 
independent variable (“STJ”) pertaining to whether or not a participant was indicated 
as having a Sensing-Thinking-Judging (STJ) cognitive style was also examined in 
the further analysis. 
 SN, TF, JP and STJ were all measured using the MBTI.  Researchers have 
extensively validated and tested the reliability of the MBTI (Myers et al. 2003; 
Wheeler 2001; Wheeler 2004a; Wheeler 2004b).24 The MBTI is the primary 
psychometric instrument for measuring Jungian theory constructs and determining 
personality types.  It has undergone numerous revisions since its initial publication in 
1962.  MBTI Form M (published in 1998) was used in the study.  Form M is 
                                                 
24 Although the MBTI has been subject to criticism (Barbuto 1997), it remains the most widely used 
personality instrument in the world and is used extensively in consulting (Myers et al. 2003).  
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arranged in a forced-choice 93-question format and yields a numerical score based 
on responses indicating a preference for one mental function or attitude versus its 
opposite (Myers et al. 2003).  The MBTI is not necessarily an indication of 
individuals’ abilities to utilize either their most or least preferred personality 
functions, but rather is only a measure of preference (Kovar et al. 2003).    
 The MBTI dimensions were originally intended to measure dichotomous 
preferences and the dichotomous preferences are widely used in research.  Although 
not entirely consistent with Jung’s original theory, the continuous scores reveal the 
strength of preferences and create the opportunity to examine the stability of 
preferences over time.  The validity of the continuous scores for each of the four 
dimensions has been indicated as strong (Wheeler 2001; Kovar et al. 2003) and 
researchers have used the continuous preference clarity index in prior research 
(Kovar et al. 2003; Wheeler et al. 2004a).   
The fourth independent variable (“PENALTY”) is a manipulated 
dichotomous variable pertaining to the level of potential professional penalties (low 
[$250] or high [three times the fee obtained for the opinion]). 
 
3.7 Control variables 
 Studies indicate that perceived likelihood of audit (“AUDIT”) may affect tax 
accountants’ assessed likelihood of recommending an aggressive transaction 
(Roberts 1998).  AUDIT, as measured using participants’ responses to a question in 
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the study instrument (assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the 
proposed aggressive transaction), was included as a potential control variable.25  
 Risk propensity (“RISK”) has been associated with aggressive 
recommendations by tax accountants (Roberts 1998).  RISK, as measured by the 
risk-taking subscale of the Jackson Personality Inventory—Revised (“JPI-R”) 
(Jackson 1994), was included as a potential control variable (scale of 0 to 20, with 
higher numbers indicating greater risk propensity).26  The JPI-R assesses personality 
variables relevant to work, educational/organizational and interpersonal situations. 
The test has been shown to be reliable and valid.27      
 Tax accountants’ client advocacy (“ADVOCACY”) has been shown to 
produce confirmation bias in the evaluation of pertinent authorities, which leads to 
higher assessed likelihood of litigation success and higher assessed likelihood of 
recommending an aggressive transaction (Davis and Mason 2003; Roberts 1998).  
ADVOCACY has also been show to affect auditors’ judgment in certain 
circumstances (Haynes et al. 1998).  ADVOCACY, as measured using the sum of 
two questions adapted from two questions from the Mason and Levy (2001) scale 
(scale of 0 to 20, with higher numbers indicating greater client advocacy), was 
included as a potential control variable.28   
                                                 
25 One participant did not respond to the AUDIT question.  The mean of the AUDIT question answers 
for the other participants was used for AUDIT for this participant. 
26 One participant did not respond to the RISK subscale.  The mean of the RISK subscale results for 
the other participants was used for RISK for this participant.  
27 Prior studies indicate that risk propensity varies between different cognitive styles and that its effect 
interacts with task environment factors (Blaylock 1981; Gardner and Martinko 1996; Henderson and 
Nutt 1980). 
28 One participant responded to only one of the ADVOCACY questions.  For this participant, 
ADVOCACY was measured as twice the single question answered. 
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3.8 Hypotheses tests 
 Hypotheses were tested using equation (1). 
(1) AGGRESSIVE = β0 + β1 RvP + β2 SN + β3 TF + β4 PENALTY + β5 RvP*SN  
+ β6 RvP*PENALTY + β7 SN*PENALTY + β8 TF*PENALTY + β9 AUDIT + β10 RISK  
+ β11 ADVOCACY + e 
For H1a β2 pertained to the rules condition and was expected to be negative 
and significant.  For H1b β2 pertained to the principles condition and was expected to 
be negative and significant.  For H1c β5 was expected to be significant.  For H2 β6 
was expected to be significant.  For H3a β7 was expected to be significant.  For H3b 
β8 was expected to be significant. 
 
4.      Results 
4.1. Initial analysis 
4.1.1 Manipulation checks 
For the manipulation check pertaining to RvP, the principles-based provision 
(present under both rules and principles) and the rules-based provision (present only 
under rules) were restated in the study questionnaire and participants were asked to 
indicate whether or not each provision was applicable in their condition.  The correct 
response for the rules condition was “yes” with respect to both provisions.  One 
participant in this condition incorrectly answered “no” with respect to the principles-
based provision and, and three participants in this condition incorrectly answered 
“no” with respect to the rules-based provision.  The correct response for the 
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principles condition was “yes” with respect to the principles-based provision and 
“no” with respect to the rules-based provision.  Two participants in this condition 
incorrectly answered “no” with respect to the principles-based provision, and one 
participant in this condition incorrectly answered “yes” with respect to the rules-
based provision.  The key difference between the rules and principles conditions is 
whether the rules-based provision was present.  If the data for participants who 
answered incorrectly with respect to this provision were excluded, neither the 
hypotheses tests results nor the further analysis tests results differ qualitatively.      
For the manipulation check pertaining to PENALTY, participants were asked 
to indicate whether the potential professional penalty amount was “$250” (the 
correct response for the “low” penalty condition) or “three times the fee obtained for 
the opinion” (the correct response for the “high” penalty condition).  Three 
participants in the “low” penalty condition incorrectly answered “three times the fee 
obtained for the opinion”.  One participant in the “high” penalty condition 
incorrectly answered “$250” and one participant in this condition did not respond to 
this manipulation check.  If the data for participants who answered incorrectly or did 
not respond with respect to the manipulation check for PENALTY were excluded, 
neither the hypotheses tests results nor the further analysis tests results differ 
qualitatively. 
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4.1.2 Study realism 
Participants on average rated the study realism as 7.2 on a 0 to 10 scale with 
higher scores indicating more assessed realism.  This indicates that participants 
believed the study entailed a relatively high degree of realism. 
 
4.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, measured independent 
variables and control variables are presented in Table 3, Panel A.   
Insert Table 3 about here 
Correlations between the dependent variable, independent variables and the 
control variables are presented in Table 3, Panel B.  RvP was coded using “0” for the 
principles condition and “1” for the rules condition.  PENALTY was coded using 
“0” for the low penalty condition and “1” for the high penalty condition.  The 
composite STJ variable was coded using “0” for non-STJ participants and “1” for 
STJ participants.  AGGRESSIVE (the dependent variable) is significantly positively 
correlated with PENALTY (r = .300, p < .018) and marginally negatively correlated 
with JP (r = -.234, p < .067).  PENALTY is marginally positively correlated with 
RISK (r = .233, p < .068).  SN is significantly positively correlated with TF (r = 
.329, p < .009) and is significantly positively correlated with RISK (r = .460, p < 
.0002).  TF is significantly positively correlated with JP (r = .415, p < .001).  RISK is 
significantly positively correlated with ADVOCACY (r = .290, p < .022).  Except 
for the correlations between STJ and its constituent elements, no other correlations 
were indicated as significant. 
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4.1.4 Study participant demographics 
The dependent variable was regressed on each demographic variable alone 
(position, years of tax experience, years of audit experience, years of other 
accounting experience, highest degree completed and gender) and on the interaction 
of each demographic variable with RvP and PENALTY.  Years of other accounting 
experience is significantly negatively related to the dependent variable (b = -0.7282, 
p < .0031).  Years of other accounting experience does not interact significantly with 
RvP (p < .4187) but does interact marginally significantly with PENALTY (p < 
.0731), with years of other accounting experience indicated as significant when 
potential professional penalties were high (three times the fee obtained for the 
opinion) (b = -1.2067, p < .002) but not when potential professional penalties were 
low ($250) (p < .2255).  No other demographic variable was significantly related to 
the dependent variable or interacted significantly with RvP or PENALTY.  Years of 
other accounting experience is not significantly correlated with any independent 
variable or any significant control variable.  Thus, exclusion of demographic 
variables should not result in biased partial slope coefficients for the model variables 
(Berry and Feldman 1985). 
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4.1.5 Study power 
To compute the desired number of participants, I used the following Cohen 
(1988) formula for determining sample size for testing fixed main and interaction 
effects in factorial designs.29   
n = (n' – 1) (μ + 1)   + 1    
      number of cells 
In the formula, n is the desired cell sample size (n is multiplied by the number of 
cells to determine N, the total sample size), n' is drawn from a table and μ is the 
degrees of freedom for the effect being analyzed.  I drew n' from the Cohen (1988) 
Table 8.3.12 (pages 311-312) for α = .05, power (1 – β) = .80, μ = 1 (for the tests of 
main effects μ = 1 [2-1] and for the tests of interaction effects μ = 1 [(2-1) * (2-1)]) 
and f = .25 (f for “medium” effect size per Cohen [1988]).  Inserting the values into 
the formula: 
 n = (62 – 1) (1 + 1)  + 1 
       4 
This yields n = 31.5, which rounded to 32 and multiplied times four yields N, or total 
desired number of participants, of 128. 
 The actual N (total number of participants) was only 62.  For tests with equal 
cell sample sizes, α = .05 and power (1 – β) = .80, the f for N of 62 is approximately 
.3530.  Effect size expressed in terms of the number of standard  
                                                 
29 Tests of interaction effects (as opposed to main effects) and tests pertaining to dichotomous (as 
opposed to continuous) variables generally are less powerful (Aiken and West 1991).  Thus, the 
Cohen (1988) formula should compute sufficient sample size to yield adequate power for testing the 
study hypotheses and further analysis. 
30 See Cohen (1988) Table 8.3.12 (pages 311-312). 
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deviations between the largest and smallest population means anticipated is d = (μ1 – 
μ2) / σε.  In most cases, d is between two and four times as large as f (Maxwell and 
Delaney 2000).  Thus, the approximate AGGRESSIVE percentage effect size for N 
of 62 is between 17.82% (effect size / 25.46% = f of .35 * 2) and 35.64% (effect size 
/ 25.46% = f of .35 * 4).  Using the standard deviation of AGGRESSIVE of 25.46% 
as an estimate of population within-cell error variance, for N of 62 the power for a 
“medium” AGGRESSIVE percentage effect size of 12.73% (effect size / 25.46% = f 
of .25 * 2) to 25.46% (effect size / 25.46% = f of .25 * 4) is approximately 50%31.   
 In addition to effect size, sample size and α, power (1 – β) is affected by the 
degree of extraneous variability and the normality of data (Maxwell and Delaney 
2000; Toothaker and Miller 1996).  In both the hypotheses tests (section 4.2) and the 
further analysis (section 4.3), variables that reduce extraneous variability were 
included.  AGGRESSIVE has a skewness of 1.80 and a kurtosis of 2.22, and a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit test (Sheskin 2004) indicates that the values of 
AGGRESSIVE are not normally distributed (asymp. sig. 2-tailed = .000).  I thus 
transformed the values of AGGRESSIVE using a square root transformation 
(Maxwell and Delaney 2000) and used these transformed values for both the 
hypotheses tests (section 4.2) and the further analysis (section 4.3). 
 
                                                 
31 See Cohen (1988) Table 8.3.12 (pages 311-312). 
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4.2 Hypotheses tests 
 Because the focus of the hypotheses and the further analysis is interaction 
effects, I centered all of the continuous independent variables (Jaccard and Turrisi 
2003).  All results are reported using non-standardized coefficients.  All reported Pr 
> t for t values pertain to two-tailed t tests. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
See Table 4.  In Panel A RvP was coded such that the SN parameter estimate 
pertains to the rules condition, while in Panel B RvP was coded such that the SN 
parameter estimate pertains to the principles condition (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  
Neither RISK nor ADVOCACY approached marginal significance in the initial 
hypotheses tests and thus were dropped from the reported hypotheses tests.     
With respect to Hypothesis 1a, b2 in Panel A is not negative and significant as 
expected.  With respect to Hypothesis 1b, b2 in Panel B is not negative and 
significant as expected.  With respect to Hypothesis 1c, b5 is not significant as 
expected.  With respect to Hypothesis 2, b6 is not significant as expected.  With 
respect to Hypothesis 3a, b7 is not significant as expected.  With respect to 
Hypothesis 3b, b8 is not significant as expected.     
 
4.3 Further analysis 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Because SN is significantly positively correlated with TF (r = .329, p < .009) 
and TF is significantly positively correlated with JP (r = .415, p < .001), testing for 
the effect of one cognitive style element in the presence of other cognitive style 
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elements may yield lower power (Berry and Feldman 1985).  Further, the complexity 
of the study model likely reduces the power of testing for any given effect (Hayes 
1994).  Finally, Jungian Theory is consistent with cognitive style effects in addition 
to the hypothesized effects.  Thus, in the further analysis I examine the interaction of 
RvP and PENALTY controlling only for AUDIT, the interaction of RvP with each of 
the cognitive style elements (SN, TF and JP) and STJ controlling only for 
PENALTY and AUDIT, and the interaction of PENALTY with each of the cognitive 
style elements (SN, TF and JP) and STJ controlling only for AUDIT.  Neither RISK 
nor ADVOCACY approached marginal significance in the initial further analysis 
tests and thus were dropped from the reported further analysis tests. 
 
4.3.2 RvP and PENALTY 
With respect to the interaction of RvP and PENALTY, see Table 3, panels C 
through E.  RvP and PENALTY are not indicated as interacting significantly (p < 
.8363).  See Panels D and E.    
The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions 
obtained by crossing RvP and PENALTY are presented in Panel C.  Participants 
were more aggressive under rules than under principles in both PENALTY 
conditions.  However, RvP is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable 
(p < .1971).  See Panel B.   
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Surprisingly, participants were more aggressive when potential professional 
penalties were high rather than low under both rules and principles.  PENALTY is 
significantly positively correlated with the dependent variable (r = .300, p < .018), 
indicating greater aggressiveness when potential professional penalties were high 
rather than low.  See Panel B.  One possible explanation for this surprising indication 
is that PENALTY is marginally positively correlated with RISK (r = .233, p < .068), 
indicating that participants assigned to the high penalty condition had greater risk 
propensity than participants assigned to the low penalty condition.  However, RISK 
is not significantly correlated with the dependent variable (p < .843).  See Panel B.  
Another possible explanation is the Cuccia (1994) backlash effect, under which 
accounting professionals behave more aggressively in response to regulatory 
attempts to reduce their aggressiveness.   
Kadous et al. (2003) highlights another possible explanation.  In Kadous et al. 
(2003) performing a quality assessment amplified the effect of participants’ 
(experienced auditors) directional goals on their acceptance of a client-preferred 
accounting method and on their ratings of the quality of that method.  The results 
were consistent with the authors’ expectations grounded in motivated reasoning 
theory.  The authors expected that, because requiring a quality assessment would 
force auditors to not only decide whether a method is acceptable but to also consider 
whether the method is close enough in quality to the best method, auditors required 
to perform a quality assessment would increase the intensity of their effort devoted to 
justifying the client-preferred method and this additional justification effort would 
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increase both the perceived quality and acceptability of that method.  In the instant 
study, the relatively severe potential professional penalty in the high penalty 
condition may have motivated participants in that condition to similarly increase the 
intensity of their effort devoted to justifying providing the opinion supporting the 
proposed aggressive transaction.  Such additional justification effort may have 
increased the perceived acceptability of the proposed aggressive transaction and thus 
resulted in greater willingness to provide an opinion supporting the proposed 
aggressive transaction.     
 
4.3.3 Perceiving (SN) mental function 
Insert Table 5 about here 
With respect to the Perceiving (SN) mental function, see Table 5.  The mean 
(std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions obtained by crossing RvP 
and dichotomous SN are presented in Panel A.  Contrary to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, 
Intuitors (N) were more aggressive than Sensors (S) under both rules and principles.  
In panel B the parameter estimate for SN pertains to the rules condition, while in 
panel C the parameter estimate for SN pertains to the  
principles condition (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  SN is not significant under rules (p 
< .2895) or under principles (p < .6189) and does not significantly interact with RvP 
(p < .2736).  See Panels B and C.  
One possible explanation for Intuitors (N) unexpectedly exhibiting greater 
aggressiveness than Sensors (S) is that Intuitors (N) have higher risk propensity.  SN 
and RISK are significantly positively correlated (r = .461, p < .0002).  See Table 3, 
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Panel B.  However, if RISK is also included as a control variable, SN is not 
significant under either rules (p < .5294) or principles (p < .7456).  Thus, study 
results are not consistent with this explanation.   
The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions 
obtained by crossing PENALTY and dichotomous SN are presented in Panel D.  
Both Intuitors (N) and Sensors (S) were more aggressive when potential professional 
penalties were high rather than low.  This effect is significant (p < .0137).  SN does 
not interact significantly with PENALTY (p < .2958).  See Panels E and F. 
 
4.3.4 Judging (TF) mental function 
The study results with respect to the Perceiving (SN) mental function are 
unexpected in light of prior studies (discussed in Section 2.3).  However, prior 
studies did not ask participants to make decisions they may have perceived as 
professionally questionable.  Study results indicate that the Judging (TF) mental 
function may be more important when making decisions perceived as professionally 
questionable. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
With respect to the Judging (TF) mental function, see Table 6.  The mean 
(std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions obtained by crossing RvP 
and dichotomous TF are presented in Panel A.  Feelers (F) were slightly (3.73%) 
more aggressive than Thinkers (T) under principles, but Thinkers (T) were 7.86% 
more aggressive than Feelers (F) under rules.  In panel B the parameter estimate for 
TF pertains to the rules condition, while in panel C the parameter estimate for TF 
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pertains to the principles condition (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  TF is significant 
under rules (b1 = -0.0855, p < .0460), indicating that under rules Thinkers (T) were 
more willing to approve an aggressive transaction than were Feelers (F).  See Panel 
B.  TF is not significant under principles (p < .6832).  See Panel C.  The interaction 
of TF and RvP is marginally significant (p < .0705).  See Panels B and C.   
These results evidence that under rules but not under principles Thinkers (T) 
may be more aggressive than Feelers (F).  Although hypotheses consistent with these 
results were not proposed, the results are consistent with Jungian Theory.  When 
making a decision, Thinkers (T) focus primarily on potential logical consequences, 
while Feelers (F) focus primarily on personal and social values (Myers and Myers 
1995; Myers et al. 2003).  Under principles, Thinkers (T) are likely restrained by 
perceived potential negative consequences if they approve the aggressive transaction, 
while Feelers (F) are likely restrained by their personal and social values from 
approving an aggressive transaction that does not accord with the intent and purpose 
of the principles-based provision.  Thus, under principles both Thinkers (T) and 
Feelers (F) exhibited little aggressiveness (mean response to AGGRESSIVE of 
9.00% for Thinkers [T] and 12.73% for Feelers [F]).  Feelers (F) were not materially 
more aggressive under rules than under principles (increase in mean response to 
AGGRESSIVE of only 0.91%), likely because the abstract principles-based 
provision (present under both rules and principles) still indicated that the aggressive 
transaction did not accord with the intent and purpose of relevant standards.  
However, Thinkers (T) were materially more aggressive under rules than under 
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principles (increase in mean response to AGGRESSIVE of 12.50%), likely because 
they believed that the bright-line rules-based provision (present only under rules) 
would shield them from negative consequences if they approved the aggressive 
transaction.  See Panel A. 
The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions 
obtained by crossing PENALTY and dichotomous TF are presented in Panel D.  
Both Thinkers (T) and Feelers (F) were more aggressive when potential professional 
penalties were high rather than low.  This effect is significant (p < .0111).  TF does 
not interact significantly with PENALTY (p < .8643).  See Panels E and F. 
 
4.3.5 Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude 
Insert Table 7 about here 
With respect to the Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude, see Table 7.  The mean 
(std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions obtained by crossing RvP 
and dichotomous JP are presented in Panel A.  Judging (J) types were approximately 
12.5% more aggressive that Perceiving (P) types under both rules and principles.  
Consistently, AGGRESSIVE is marginally negatively correlated with JP (r = -.234, p 
< .067, see Table 3, Panel B) and a t-test indicates a significant difference between 
Judging (J) types and Perceiving (P) types (with RvP collapsed) for AGGRESSIVE 
(p < .0412).  Although hypotheses consistent with these results were not proposed, 
the results are consistent with Jungian Theory.  Perceiving (P) types likely spent 
longer perceiving the study scenario information and thus viewed the facts in a more 
holistic fashion and were more cognizant (than were Judging [J] types) that the 
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aggressive transaction did not comply with the abstract principles-based provision 
(present under both rules and principles).  In panel B the parameter estimate for JP 
pertains to the rules condition, while in panel C the parameter estimate for JP 
pertains to the principles condition (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  Although 
AGGRESSIVE is marginally negatively correlated with JP (r = -.234, p < .067) and 
a t-test indicates a significant difference between Judging (J) types and Perceiving 
(P) types (with RvP collapsed) for AGGRESSIVE (p < .0412), in the presence of 
PENALTY and AUDIT JP is not significant under rules (p < .1575) or under 
principles (p < .3672) and does not significantly interact with RvP (p < .7346).  See 
Panels B and C. 
The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions 
obtained by crossing PENALTY and dichotomous JP are presented in Panel D.  
Judging (J) types were 22.35% more aggressive than Perceiving (P) types when 
potential professional penalties were high, while Judging (J) types were only 1.35% 
more aggressive than Perceiving (P) types when potential professional penalties were 
low.  In panel E the parameter estimate for JP pertains to the low penalty condition, 
while in panel F the parameter estimate for JP pertains to the high penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003).  JP interacts significantly with PENALTY (p < .0353) 
and is indicated as significant when potential professional penalties are high (b1 = -
0.0954, p < .0078) but not when they are low (p < .8998).  See Panels E and F.  I did 
not locate any material pertaining to Jungian theory that would explain this result.  It 
is possible that Judging (J) types were made to feel uncomfortable by a high 
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potential professional penalty and quickly ceased the perception needed to accurately 
grasp the nature of the aggressive transaction.  However, this approaches 
speculation. 
 
4.3.6 STJ cognitive style 
Insert Table 8 about here 
I also examined the effect of the cognitive style elements together.  STJ is the 
most prevalent cognitive style of accountants, with nearly 40% of accountants being 
STJs (Kovar et al. 2003).  With respect to the study results for STJ participants 
versus non-STJ participants, see Table 8.  The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent 
variable in the four conditions obtained by crossing RvP and STJ are presented in 
Panel A.  STJs were 2.02% less aggressive than non-STJs under principles but were 
15.19% more aggressive than non-STJs under rules.  In panel B the parameter 
estimate for STJ pertains to the rules condition, while in panel C the parameter 
estimate for STJ pertains to the principles condition (Jaccard 1998).  STJ is 
significant under rules (p < .0123) but is not significant under principles (p < .5861) 
and the interaction of STJ and RvP is significant (p < .0315).  See Panels B and C. 
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Under both rules and principles, the mean response to AGGRESSIVE for 
non-STJs differs by less than 2% from the mean response for Feelers (F).  Under 
principles the mean response to AGGRESSIVE for STJs differs by only 
approximately 0.1% from the mean response for Thinkers (T), while under rules the 
mean response to AGGRESSIVE for STJs was 7.50% higher than the mean response 
for Thinkers (T) (29.00% for STJs versus 21.50% for Thinkers [T]).  Thus, the 
differential effect of the Judging (TF) mental function between rules and principles 
may be enhanced if a Thinker (T) is also a Sensor (S) and a Judging (J) type.  Such 
enhancement would be consistent with Jungian theory.  With respect to the 
Perceiving (SN) mental function, if Sensors (S) focus more (than Intuitors [N]) on 
the bright-line rules-based provision present only under rules (as expected in the 
hypotheses) this would enhance the effect of Thinkers (T) believing that this 
provision would shield them from negative consequences if they approved the 
aggressive transaction.  With respect to the Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude, under 
both rules and principles Perceiving (P) types likely spent longer perceiving the 
study scenario information and thus viewed the facts in a more holistic fashion and 
were more cognizant (than Judging [J] types) that the aggressive transaction did not 
comply with the abstract principles-based provision (present under both rules and 
principles).  However, it is likely that this effect was greatest for Thinkers (T) under 
rules because Judging (J) types most quickly ceased perception if they were focused 
on potential logical consequences and believed that the bright-line rules-based 
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provision (present only under rules) would shield them from negative consequences 
if they approved the aggressive transaction.  
The mean (std. dev.) for the dependent variable in the four conditions 
obtained by crossing PENALTY and STJ are presented in Panel D.  Both STJs and 
non-STJs were more aggressive when potential professional penalties were high 
rather than low.  In panel E the parameter estimate for STJ pertains to the low 
penalty condition, while in panel F the parameter estimate for STJ pertains to the 
high penalty condition (Jaccard 1998).  STJ is not indicated as significant when 
potential professional penalties are high (p < .1110) or low (p < .6422) and STJ does 
not interact significantly with PENALTY (p < .4182).  See Panels E and F.  The 
mean response to AGGRESSIVE for STJs in the high penalty condition (32.00%) 
was only 1.47% higher than the mean response to AGGRESSIVE for Judging (J) 
types in the high penalty condition (30.53%).  Thus, the differential effect of the 
Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude between high potential professional penalties and 
low potential professional penalties does not appear to be materially enhanced if a 
Judging (J) type is also a Sensor (S) and a Thinker (T).       
 
5. Study Weaknesses 
 The greatest weakness of this study is the small sample size, which raises 
concerns regarding power and external validity.  Participants were only 62 
volunteers from the pool of 2,016 OSCPA members in public practice.  Total sample 
size of 62 yields only power (1 – β) of approximately 50% for a “medium” effect 
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size of approximately between 12.73% and 25.46%, which is considerably lower 
than the generally recommended power of 80% (Cohen 1988).    
For the study to be of use for the intended purpose, it must be valid to 
generalize the study results for the 62 participants to the general accountant 
population.  This generalization could be of questionable validity for a number of 
reasons.   
First, the pool of potential participants may differ from the general 
accountant population.  That is, OSCPA members in public practice may differ from 
the United States accountant population in general.  For example, Oklahoma 
accountants are almost certainly more likely to practice in a rural setting than are 
accountants in many other states.  Further, Oklahoma is located in the “Bible Belt”.  
Religiosity has been shown to impact taxpayer compliance (Grasmick et al. 1991) 
and may also impact accountant aggressiveness.   
Second, the 62 individuals who volunteered to help a Ph.D. student with their 
dissertation may differ in some respects from the other 1,954 OSCPA members in 
public practice.  That is, self-selection bias may have occurred.  Of the 5,826 
OSCPA members in good standing as of January 12, 2006, 62% were male as 
compared to 69% of participants.  For these OSCPA members, median number of 
years as a CPA was approximately 20 years.  For the participants who indicated a 
practice area of tax compliance or tax planning, median professional experience was 
24 years.  Thus, the 62 OSCPA members who volunteered likely differ from the 
other 1,954 members in public practice at least to a certain degree with respect to 
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certain demographics.  The participants may be less task-focused, which would be 
consistent with only 59.7% of participants being a Judging (J) type versus 71.7% of 
accountants generally (See Table 1). Further, participants may have an unusually 
high interest in general intellectual pursuits, may be more highly educated, may be 
more civic minded, may feel more of a duty to help their fellow citizens, etc.  These 
are only a few of the possible differential characteristics that come to mind.            
Another potential limitation of this study is that care may need to be taken 
when generalizing the results to non-tax accounting realms (Cuccia et al. 1995).      
 
6. Conclusion 
I examined the effect of accountants’ cognitive styles and the severity of 
potential professional penalties under rules-based versus principles-based standards 
in the context of client pressure to approve of an inappropriately aggressive 
transaction.  Cognitive style was operationalized using the MBTI.  My hypotheses 
pertained to the expected effect of Sensing (S) versus Intuition (N) and the severity 
of potential professional penalties.  While my hypotheses were not supported, further 
analysis of study results provides evidence of relations between accountants’ 
aggressiveness, standard precision and cognitive style that are interesting and 
consistent with Jungian theory.   
With respect to the individual elements of cognitive style, the Perceiving 
(SN) mental function was not significant and did not interact significantly with 
standard precision (rules-based versus principles-based standards, or rules versus 
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principles).  The Judging (TF) mental function interacted marginally significantly 
with standard precision and was significant under rules but not significant under 
principles, with Thinkers (T) under rules exhibiting greater aggressiveness (21.5% 
mean chance of approving an inappropriately aggressive transaction versus 9.00%, 
12.73% and 13.64%).  This differential effect of the Judging (TF) mental function 
may be enhanced if the Thinker (T) is also a Sensor (S) and a Judging (J) type (STJ) 
(29% mean chance of approving an inappropriately aggressive transaction for STJs 
versus 21.5% chance of doing so for Thinkers [T]).        
While 40.2% of the general U.S. population are Thinkers (T), 70.5% of 
accounting professionals are Thinkers (T).  While 20.3% of the general U.S. 
population are STJs, 39.1% of accounting professionals are STJs and the STJ 
cognitive style combination is the most prevalent cognitive style combination for 
accounting professionals.  Thus, this study provides evidence that the cognitive style 
preferences materially more prevalent among accounting professionals than the 
general U.S. population may lead to more willingness to approve an inappropriately 
aggressive transaction under rules but not under principles. 
Surprisingly, under both rules-based and principles-based standards, 
significantly greater aggressiveness was indicated when potential professional 
penalties were high (three times the fee obtained for the opinion) rather than low 
($250).  Thus, this study provides evidence that increasing the monetary amount of 
potential professional penalties may not lower, and may even heighten, the 
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willingness of accountants to approve an aggressive transaction under either rules or 
principles. 
These results may be of interest to policymakers who aim to promulgate 
standards that result in consistent and not overly aggressive application by 
accountants.  Further, because with awareness and training one can become quite 
competent at using their non-preferred cognitive styles and can learn to bring their  
non-preferred cognitive styles to bear in appropriate circumstances (Myers and 
Myers 1995; Myers et al. 2003), these results may be of interest to accounting 
educators (Kovar et al. 2003).  
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Table 1 
Mental Functions and Attitudes of Study Participants, Accountants and the 
General U.S. Population (percentages) 
 
 I 
(E) 
S 
(N) 
T 
(F) 
J 
(P) 
STJ
% Study Participants 
 
50.0 
(50.0)
61.3 
(38.7)
64.5 
(35.5) 
59.7 
(40.3) 
 
30.6
Mean % Accounting Professional Studies
(Kovar et al. 2003) 
 
51.9 
(48.1)
66.6 
(33.4)
70.5 
(29.6) 
71.7 
(28.3) 
39.1
Mean % General U.S. Population32 
(Myers et al. 2003) 
 
50.7 
(49.3)
73.3 
(26.7)
40.2 
(59.8) 
54.1 
(45.9) 
20.3
 
                                                 
32 Mean % General U.S. Population differs materially by gender for Thinking (T) versus Feeling (F) 
and STJ versus non-STJ.  Mean % General U.S. Population by gender is presented below (Myers et 
al. 2003). 
 
 I S T J STJ 
% Males 54.1 71.7 56.5 52.0 27.6 
% Females 47.5 74.9 24.5 56.2 13.2 
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Table 2 
 
Participant Demographics 
 
Panel A: Position 
 
Position n 
Tax Compliance 29 
Audit 15 
Other 9 
Tax Planning 7 
Not Indicated 2 
 
 
Panel B: Years of accounting experience 
 
Experience Mean (Std. Dev.)
Tax 16.7 (12.2)
Audit 9.3 (11.2)
Other Accounting 9.5 (12.9)
 
 
Panel C: Highest degree completed 
 
Degree n 
Bachelors Accountancy 22
Masters Accountancy 10
Not Indicated 9
Bachelors Other 8
Bachelors Business 6
Masters Tax 3
Masters Business Admin 2
Masters Other 2
 
 
Panel D: Gender 
 
Gender n 
Male 42 
Female 19 
Not Indicated 1 
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Table 3 
 
Dependent, Independent and Control Variables 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) for dependent variable, continuous independent 
variables and control variables 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
 
Dependent variable: 
AGGRESSIVE (0 to 100 scale) 14.52 (25.46)
 
Independent variables: 
SN (-30 to 30 scale) -7.35 (15.78)
TF (-30 to 30 scale) -6.87 (14.31)
JP (-30 to 30 scale) -8.65 (16.29)
 
Control variables: 
RISK (0 to 20 scale) 6.54 (4.10)
ADVOCACY (0 to 20 scale) 12.48 (5.21)
AUDIT (0 to 100 scale) 94.26 (13.11)
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Panel B: Correlations of the dependent variable, independent variables 
and control variables 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 62 
Prob > | r | Ho : Rho = 0 
 
      AGGR  RvP   PEN  SN   TF   JP   STJ  AUD  RISK ADV  
AGGR 1.000 
 
0.166 
0.197 
0.300 
0.018 
-.009 
0.942 
-0.034 
0.796 
-0.234 
0.067 
0.131 
0.312 
-0.140 
0.278 
0.026 
0.843 
-0.044 
0.735 
RvP   1.000 0.129 
0.317 
0.008 
0.949 
0.043 
0.739 
0.000 
1.000 
0.035 
0.787 
-0.154 
0.233 
0.065 
0.614 
-0.037 
0.773 
PEN    1.000 0.069 
0.592 
0.157 
0.222 
0.027 
0.837 
0.056 
0.663 
0.040 
0.756 
0.233 
0.068 
0.015 
0.905 
SN      1.000 0.329 
0.009 
0.190 
0.140 
-0.631 
<.001 
-0.090 
0.488 
0.461 
<.001 
0.126 
0.330 
TF       1.000 0.415 
0.001 
-0.531 
<.001 
-0.155 
0.230 
0.005 
0.971 
0.050 
0.698 
JP        1.000 -0.491 
<.001 
0.037 
0.777 
0.181 
0.159 
-0.017 
0.893 
STJ        1.000 0.159 
0.217 
-0.183 
0.154 
0.087 
0.504 
AUD         1.000 0.011 
0.935 
0.204 
0.112 
RISK         1.000 0.290 
0.022 
ADV           1.000 
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Panel C: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE by study condition 
 
 Low penalty  High penalty 
Principles 5.00 
(15.43) 
n = 18 
17.69 
(28.03) 
n = 13 
Rules 10.00 
(18.81) 
n = 14 
25.88 
(32.80) 
n = 17 
 
 
 
Panel D: Ancova-PENALTY parameter estimate pertains to rules 
condition (Jaccard 1998) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 RvP + b2 PENALTY + b3 RvP*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e  
 
Source Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0= 5.4657  2.8577 1.91 .0608 
RvP  b1 = -1.0192 1.0862 -0.94 .3520 
PENALTY b2 = 1.6567 1.0938 1.51 .1354 
RvP*PENALTY b3 = 0.3222  1.5522  0.21 .8363 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0388 0.0230 -1.30 .2002 
R2 = 0.142688    
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.7493 2.37 .0630 
Error 57 9.1702  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel E: Ancova-PENALTY parameter estimate pertains to principles 
  condition (Jaccard 1998) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 RvP + b2 PENALTY + b3 RvP*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e  
 
Source Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 4.4465  2.9520 1.51 .1375 
RvP  b1 = 1.0192 1.0862 0.94 .3520 
PENALTY b2 = 1.9789 1.1033 1.79 .0782 
RvP*PENALTY b3 = -0.3222  1.5522  -0.21 .8363 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0388 0.0300 -1.30 .2002 
R2 = 0.142688    
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.7493 2.37 .0630 
Error 57 9.1702  
Corrected Total 61  
  
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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Table 4 
 
Hypotheses Tests 
 
Panel A: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to rules condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 RvP + b2 SN + b3 TF + b4 PENALTY + b5 RvP*SN  
+ b6 RvP*PENALTY + b7 SN*PENALTY + b8 TF*PENALTY + b9 AUDIT + e   
 
Source Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.7160 2.9251 1.95 .0561 
RvP b1 = -1.0847 1.1260 -0.96 .3399 
SN b2 = 0.0044 0.0491  0.09 .9282 
TF b3 = -0.0321 0.0451 -0.71 .4799 
PENALTY b4 = 2.0200 1.1521  1.75 .0854 
RvP*SN b5 = 0.0460 0.0518 0.89 .3791 
RvP*PENALTY b6 = 0.1043 1.6072 0.06 .9485 
SN*PENALTY b7 = -0.0642 0.0551 -1.16 .2496 
TF*PENALTY b8 = 0.0058 0.0601 0.10 .9236 
AUDIT b9 = -0.0422  0.0309 -1.37 .1773 
R2 = 0.196997    
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  9 13.3455 1.42 .2050 
Error 52 9.4153  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel B: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to principles condition 
  (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 RvP + b2 SN + b3 TF + b4 PENALTY + b5 RvP*SN  
+ b6 RvP*PENALTY + b7 SN*PENALTY + b8 TF*PENALTY + b9 AUDIT + e   
 
Source Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 4.6313 3.0306 1.53 .1325 
RvP b1 = 1.0847 1.1260 0.96 .3399 
SN b2 = 0.0504 0.0429  1.18 .2450 
TF b3 = -0.0321 0.0451 -0.71 .4799 
PENALTY b4 = 2.1243 1.1346  1.87 .0668 
RvP*SN b5 = -0.0460 0.0518 -0.89 .3791 
RvP*PENALTY b6 = -0.1043 1.6072 -0.06 .9485 
SN*PENALTY b7 = -0.0642 0.0551 -1.16 .2496 
TF*PENALTY b8 = 0.0058 0.0601 0.10 .9236 
AUDIT b9 = -0.0422  0.0309 -1.37 .1773 
R2 = 0.196997    
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  9 13.3455 1.42 .2050 
Error 52 9.4153  
Corrected Total 61  
 
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
SN = participants’ Perceiving (SN) mental function preference measured using the MBTI  
         (range from -30 for Sensing (S) to +30 for Intuition (N)) 
TF = participants’ Judging (TF) mental function preference measured using the MBTI  
         (range from -30 for Thinking (T) to +30 for Feeling (F)) 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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 Table 5 
 
Effect of Sensing (S) versus Intuitive (N) Perceiving Mental Function on 
Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, RvP by SN  
 
 Sensing (S) Intuitive (N) 
Principles  8.95 
(23.55) 
n = 19 
12.50 
(20.50) 
n = 12 
Rules 15.79 
(26.94) 
n = 19 
23.33 
(30.55) 
n = 12 
 
 
 
Panel B: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to rules condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 SN + b2 RvP + b3 SN*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.3802 2.8274 1.90 .0622 
SN  b1 = -0.0377 0.0352 -1.07 .2895 
RvP b2 = -0.8381 0.7838 -1.07 .2896 
SN*RvP b3 = 0.0551 0.0499 1.11 .2736 
PENALTY b4 = 2.0004  0.7909 2.53 .0143 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0399 0.0300 -1.33 .1891 
R2 = .162711     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 19.8412 2.18 .0696 
Error 56 9.1160  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel C: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to principles condition 
  (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 SN + b2 RvP + b3 SN*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 4.5421 2.9368 1.55 .1276 
SN  b1 = 0.0175 0.0349  0.50 .6189 
RvP b2 = 0.8381 0.7838 1.07 .2896 
SN*RvP b3 = -0.0551 0.0499 -1.11 .2736 
PENALTY b4 = 2.0004  0.7909 2.53 .0143 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0399 0.0300 -1.33 .1891 
R2 = .162711     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 19.8412 2.18 .0696 
Error 56 9.1160  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel D: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, PENALTY by SN 
 
 Sensing (S) Intuitive (N) 
High Penalty  23.33 
(33.25) 
n = 18 
20.83 
(27.46) 
n = 12 
Low Penalty 2.50 
(5.50) 
n = 20 
15.00 
(25.41) 
n = 12 
 
 
 
Panel E: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to low penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 SN + b2 PENALTY + b3 SN*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.4443 2.8340 1.92 .0597 
SN  b1 = 0.0130 0.0332 0.39 .6957 
PENALTY b2 = 1.9643 0.7721  2.54 .0137 
SN*PENALTY b3 = -0.0523 0.0496 -1.06 .2958 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0446 0.0297 -1.50 .1390 
R2 = .143218     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.8301 2.38 .0621 
Error 57 9.1645  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel F: Ancova-SN parameter estimate pertains to high penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 SN + b2 PENALTY + b3 SN*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 7.4086 2.8727 2.58 .0125 
SN  b1 = -0.0393 0.0370 -1.06 .2925 
PENALTY b2 = -1.9643 0.7721  -2.54 .0137 
SN*PENALTY b3 = 0.0523 0.0496 1.06 .2958 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0446 0.0297 -1.50 .1390 
R2 = .143218     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.8301 2.38 .0621 
Error 57 9.1645  
Corrected Total 61  
 
 
 
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
SN = participants’ Perceiving (SN) mental function preference measured using the MBTI  
         (range from -30 for Sensing (S) to +30 for Intuition (N)) 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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Table 6 
 
Effect of Thinking (T) versus Feeling (F) Judging Mental Function on 
Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, RvP by TF 
 
 Thinking (T) Feeling (F) 
Principles 9.00 
(20.49) 
n = 20 
12.73 
(25.73) 
n = 11 
Rules 21.50 
(29.07) 
n = 20 
13.64 
(26.93) 
n = 11 
 
 
 
Panel B: Ancova-TF parameter estimate pertains to rules condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
   
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 TF + b2 RvP + b3 TF*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 6.5828  2.8096 2.34 .0227 
TF  b1 = -0.0855 0.0419 -2.04 .0460 
RvP b2 = -0.8220 0.7642  -1.08 .2868 
TF*RvP b3 = 0.0998 0.0542 1.84 .0705 
PENALTY b4 = 2.0471  0.7685 2.66 .0101 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0527 0.0299 -1.76 .0839 
R2 = .204009     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 24.8770 2.87 .0224 
Error 56 8.6664  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel C: Ancova-TF parameter estimate pertains to principles condition 
  (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 TF + b2 RvP + b3 TF*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.7609  2.9175 1.97 .0533 
TF  b1 = 0.0143 0.0350  0.41 .6832 
RvP b2 = 0.8220 0.7642  1.08 .2868 
TF*RvP b3 = -0.0998 0.0542 -1.84 .0705 
PENALTY b4 = 2.0471  0.7685 2.66 .0101 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0527 0.0299 -1.76 .0839 
R2 = .204009     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 24.8770 2.87 .0224 
Error 56 8.6664  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel D: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, PENALTY by TF 
 
 Thinking (T) Feeling (F) 
High Penalty 22.22 
(30.59) 
n = 18 
22.50 
(31.94) 
n = 12 
Low Penalty 9.55 
(19.63) 
n = 22 
2.00 
(6.32) 
n = 10 
 
 
 
Panel E: Ancova-TF parameter estimate pertains to low penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 TF+ b2 PENALTY + b3 TF*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.7559 2.8616 2.01 .0490 
TF  b1 = -0.0216 0.0403 -0.54 .5940 
PENALTY b2 = 2.0564 0.7831  2.63 .0111 
TF*PENALTY b3 = -0.0095 0.0551 -0.17 .8643 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0486 0.0301 -1.61 .1123 
R2 = .138073     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.0458 2.28 .0715 
Error 57 9.2196  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel F: Ancova-TF parameter estimate pertains to high penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003) 
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 TF+ b2 PENALTY + b3 TF*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 7.8123 2.9160 2.68 .0096 
TF  b1 = -0.0311 0.0382 -0.81 .4191 
PENALTY b2 = -2.0564 0.7831  -2.63 .0111 
TF*PENALTY b3 = 0.0095 0.0551 0.17 .8643 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0486 0.0301 -1.61 .1123 
R2 = .138073     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 21.0458 2.28 .0715 
Error 57 9.2196  
Corrected Total 61  
 
 
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
TF = participants’ Judging (TF) mental function preference measured using the MBTI  
         (range from -30 for Thinking (T) to +30 for Feeling (F)) 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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Table 7 
 
Effect of Judging (J) versus Perceiving (P) Attitude or Orientation Toward the 
Outer World on Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, RvP by JP  
 
 Judging (J) Perceiving (P) 
Principles 15.26 
(26.95) 
n = 19 
2.50 
(6.22) 
n = 12 
Rules 23.89 
(31.09) 
n = 18 
11.54 
(22.67) 
n = 13 
 
 
Panel B: Ancova-JP parameter estimate pertains to rules condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003)    
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 JP + b2 RvP + b3 JP*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.1564 2.7854 1.85 .0694 
JP  b1 = -0.0467 0.0326 -1.43 .1575 
RvP b2 = -0.8676 0.7735  -1.12 .2668 
JP*RvP b3 = 0.0160 0.0470 0.34 .7346 
PENALTY b4 = 1.8524  0.7657 2.42 .0188 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0367 0.0295 -1.24 .2200 
R2 = .183996     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 22.4365 2.53 .0394 
Error 56 8.8843  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel C: Ancova-JP parameter estimate pertains to principles condition 
  (Jaccard and Turrisi 2003)   
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 JP + b2 RvP + b3 JP*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 4.2888 2.8933 1.48 .1439 
JP  b1 = -0.0307 0.0338 -0.91 .3672 
RvP b2 = 0.8676 0.7735  1.12 .2668 
JP*RvP b3 = -0.0160 0.0470 -0.34 .7346 
PENALTY b4 = 1.8524  0.7657 2.42 .0188 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0367 0.0295 -1.24 .2200 
R2 = .183996     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 22.4365 2.53 .0394 
Error 56 8.8843  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel D: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, PENALTY by JP 
 
 Judging (J) Perceiving (P) 
High Penalty 30.53 
(34.40) 
n = 19 
8.18 
(15.37) 
n = 11 
Low Penalty 7.78 
(15.55) 
n = 18 
6.43 
(19.06) 
n = 14 
 
 
 
Panel E: Ancova-JP parameter estimate pertains to low penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003)     
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 JP + b2 PENALTY + b3 JP*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.9111 2.7042 2.19 .0329 
JP  b1 = 0.0038 0.0301 0.13 .8998 
PENALTY b2 = 1.9802 0.7316  2.71 .0089 
JP*PENALTY b3 = -0.0992 0.0460 -2.16 .0353 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0497 0.0283 -1.75 .0846 
R2 = .227058     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 34.6095 4.19 .0048 
Error 57 8.2678  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel F: Ancova-JP parameter estimate pertains to high penalty condition 
(Jaccard and Turrisi 2003)     
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 JP + b2 PENALTY + b3 JP*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 7.8913 2.7363 2.88 .0055 
JP  b1 = -0.0954 0.0346 -2.76 .0078 
PENALTY b2 = -1.9802 0.7316 -2.71 .0089 
JP*PENALTY b3 = 0.0992 0.0460 2.16 .0353 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0497 0.0283 -1.75 .0846 
R2 = .227058     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 34.6095 4.19 .0048 
Error 57 8.2678  
Corrected Total 61  
 
 
 
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
JP = participants’ Judging-Perceiving (JP) attitude preference measured using the MBTI  
         (range from -30 for Judging (J) to +30 for Perception (P)) 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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Table 8 
 
Effect of Sensing-Thinking-Judging (STJ) on Aggressiveness 
 
Panel A: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, RvP by STJ 
 
 STJ Not STJ 
Principles 8.89 
(23.15) 
n = 9 
10.91 
(22.23) 
n = 22 
Rules 29.00 
(32.13) 
n = 10 
13.81 
(25.39) 
n = 21 
 
Panel B: Ancova-STJ parameter estimate pertains to rules condition  
  (Jaccard 1998) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 STJ + b2 RvP + b3 STJ*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.5493 2.6955 2.06 .0442 
STJ  b1 = 2.9181 1.1275  2.59 .0123 
RvP b2 = 0.3341  0.9093  0.37 .7147 
STJ* RvP b3 = -3.5481  1.6086 -2.21 .0315 
PENALTY b4 = 1.9806  0.7466 2.65 .0104 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0519 0.0290 -1.79 .0795 
R2 = .237440     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 28.9536 3.49 .0082 
Error 56 8.3024  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel C: Ancova-STJ parameter estimate pertains to principles condition 
(Jaccard 1998) 
 
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 STJ + b2 RvP + b3 STJ*RvP + b4 PENALTY + b5 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 5.8834 2.8406 2.07 .0430 
STJ  b1 = -0.6300 1.1503 -0.55 .5861 
RvP b2 = -0.3341  0.9093  -0.37 .7147 
STJ* RvP b3 = 3.5481  1.6086  2.21 .0315 
PENALTY b4 = 1.9806  0.7466 2.65 .0104 
AUDIT b5 = -0.0519 0.0290 -1.79 .0795 
R2 = .237440     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  5 28.9536 3.49 .0082 
Error 56 8.3024  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel D: Mean (std. dev.) for AGGRESSIVE, PENALTY by STJ 
 
 STJ Not STJ 
High Penalty 32.00 
(36.15) 
n = 10 
17.50 
(27.12) 
n = 20 
Low Penalty 5.56 
(7.26) 
n = 9 
7.83 
(19.53) 
n = 23 
 
 
Panel E: Ancova-STJ parameter estimate pertains to low penalty condition 
(Jaccard 1998)     
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 STJ + b2 PENALTY + b3 STJ*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 6.0249 2.8266 2.13 .0374 
STJ  b1 = 0.5500 1.1772 0.47 .6422 
PENALTY b2 = 1.4644 0.9137  1.60 .1145 
STJ*PENALTY b3 = 1.3480 1.6530 0.82 .4182 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0526 0.0296 -1.77 .0814 
R2 = .165244     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 25.1874 2.82 .0332 
Error 57 8.9290  
Corrected Total 61  
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Panel F: Ancova-STJ parameter estimate pertains to high penalty 
condition (Jaccard 1998)     
  
AGGRESSIVE = b0 + b1 STJ + b2 PENALTY + b3 STJ*PENALTY + b4 AUDIT + e 
 
Parameter Est. unstd. b Std. Error t value Pr > t 
Intercept b0 = 7.4892 2.8269 2.65 .0104 
STJ  b1 = 1.8980 1.1723 1.62 .1110 
PENALTY b2 = -1.4644 0.9137 -1.60 .1145 
STJ*PENALTY b3 = -1.3480 1.6530 -0.82 .4182 
AUDIT b4 = -0.0526 0.0296 -1.77 .0814 
R2 = .165244     
Source DF Mean Square F value Pr > F 
Model  4 25.1874 2.82 .0332 
Error 57 8.9290  
Corrected Total 61  
 
 
 
AGGRESSIVE = participants’ assessed likelihood of whether they would approve an aggressive 
 transaction (measured using an 11-point (0% to 100%) Likert scale), transformed by 
square root transformation for Ancovas 
STJ = whether participants indicated as Sensing (S)-Thinking (T)-Judging (J) per the MBTI 
(dichotomous) 
RvP = manipulated condition rules-based standards versus principles-based standards 
PENALTY = manipulated condition low ($250) versus high (three times the fee obtained for the 
                       opinion) potential professional penalty 
AUDIT = participants’ assessed % likelihood of audit if the client engaged in the proposed aggressive 
                 transaction 
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Appendix A  
Study Instrument and Questionnaire 
Please read the following: 
This scenario is hypothetical and pertains to a mythical state. The “state 
statutes” are mythical and are not known to be substantially similar to those 
of any actual state. 
 
Assume you practice as the sole owner of an accounting firm specializing in 
providing tax advice. You have been consulted by the CFO of Healthco. 
Healthco provides group health insurance coverage for corporate client 
employees. Healthco has been a client of your firm for approximately five 
years and revenues from Healthco average approximately 2% of your firm’s 
annual revenues.  
 
Healthco operates only in your state (hereafter “State”), which has no state 
corporate income tax. State does, however, impose a “gross premiums” tax 
equal to 10% of “gross premiums” received in a particular year by 
corporations such as Healthco that meet the statutory definition of an 
“insurance company”. 
 
The market is very competitive for Healthco. CFO wants your advice regarding 
a plan he has devised to allow Healthco to reduce the cost of its employee 
group health insurance policy to employers by reducing gross premiums 
“received” and hence gross premiums tax. 
 
Currently, Healthco offers only a “standard” group health insurance policy, 
under which employers pay monthly health insurance premiums on behalf of 
their benefited employees, who are the actual insured parties. In return for 
the monthly premiums, Healthco assumes the entire obligation to provide 
health insurance coverage to the benefited employees. 
 
CFO’s plan, the “Mini-Health” policy, is designed to reduce the gross premiums 
tax by reducing the amount of gross premiums employers “pay” to Healthco 
on behalf of employees each month. Healthco would remain responsible for 
processing and then approving or rejecting all employee claims for benefits 
and negotiating or litigating any related disputes, but employers would 
assume the obligation to “pay” all employee claim payments each month until 
the aggregate employee claim payments for that month equal or exceed 80% 
of the actuarially predicted monthly average of aggregate employee claim 
payments (the “trigger amount”). Healthco would be obligated to “pay” all 
employee claim payments each month once aggregate employee claim 
payments exceed the trigger amount. 
 
Employers would be required to deposit funds equal to the trigger amount into 
a bank account in their name but accessible only to Healthco on the first of 
each month. Healthco would have unfettered use of these deposited funds 
from the time of deposit by the employers until disbursement of the funds to 
satisfy employee claims. Healthco would retain all earnings on the deposited 
funds as an additional administrative fee. 
 
Except for the above-described differences, the Mini-Health policy would not 
materially differ from the standard policy. 
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Under the standard policy, the expected level of aggregate employee claim 
payments has equaled approximately 80% of gross premiums, loading (other 
than gross premiums tax) has equaled approximately 10% of gross premiums, 
and gross premiums tax has equaled approximately 10% of gross premiums. 
(Loading typically includes a charge for assuming the risk that aggregate 
employee claim payments will exceed the expected level, the administrative 
costs, the gross premiums tax and the cost of capital.) 
 
CFO has estimated that total employer outlay under the Mini-Health policy 
would equal 92.6% of standard policy premiums, resulting in a 7.4% (100% - 
92.6%) reduction in employers’ total outlay, and there would be no other 
material tax effect on the employers, their employees or Healthco. (Under 
either the standard policy or the Mini-Health policy, employers’ benefited 
employees, the actual insured parties, would not be subject to taxation. Under 
either policy, employers would receive a deduction for federal income tax 
purposes equal to their total outlay. State has no state corporate income tax. 
Employers would not be subject to the State gross premiums tax with respect 
to the Mini-Health policy because they do not meet the statutory definition of 
an “insurance company”. There would be no material effect on Healthco’s 
federal income tax.) 
CFO's calculations of employers’ total outlay under the Mini-Health 
policy: 
 Standard Mini-Health 
 As % of Standard policy premium As % of Standard policy premium 
Gross Premium:   
Employee claim 
payments paid by 
Healthco 
80% 20% of Standard = 20% * 80% = 16% 
Loading (other than 
gross premuims tax) 10% 100% of Standard = 100% * 10% = 10% 
Gross premiums tax 10% 
10% tax rate * (employee claim payments 
paid by Helathco + loading) = 10% *(16% 
+ 10%) = 2.6% 
Gross Premium 80% + 10% + 10% = 100% 16% + 10% + 2.6% = 28.6% 
   
Total Employer 
Outlay:   
Employee claim 
payments paid by 
employer 
0% 80% (100% less 20% paid by Healthco) 
*80% = 64% 
Total Employer 
Outlay 
Gross premium + employee claim 
pyaments paid by employer = 100% 
+ 0% = 100% 
Gross premium + employee claim payments 
paid by employer = 28.6% + 64% = 92.6%
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Relevant State statutes: 
 
State Code § 1001 – Tax on Gross Premiums Received by Insurance 
Companies  
There is hereby imposed a tax on insurance companies in the amount of 10% 
of the gross premiums received from State residents during a given year. 
State Code § 1002 -- Definition of Gross Premiums Received by 
Insurance Companies  
(1) In general. —Gross premiums received by insurance companies represent 
the entire consideration paid by (or on behalf of) an insured for insurance 
coverage. This generally includes the total cost of the insurance coverage 
provided to the insured. 
 
[section (2) provided only to participants in rules standards condition] 
(2) Items included in employee group health insurance premiums. —Gross 
premiums received by an insurance company with respect to an employee 
group health insurance policy include (but are not limited to) — 
 
(A) If an employer self insures with respect to a portion of its group health 
insurance obligation to employees, but the insurance company is obligated to 
pay all employee claim payments each period once aggregate employee claim 
payments exceed a trigger amount that is less than 75% of the actuarially 
predicted average aggregate employee claim payments for that period, then 
“gross premiums received” by the insurance company shall include the sum 
of: (1) 100% of the actuarially predicted average aggregate employee claim 
payments, and (2) loading (including a charge for assuming the risk that 
aggregate employee claim payments will exceed the expected level, 
administrative costs, the gross premiums tax and the cost of capital). 
 
Relevant potential State penalties: 
Healthco’s gross premiums tax returns have been audited by the State tax 
agency every year for the past 20 years and Healthco expects them to be 
audited by the State tax agency every year for the foreseeable future. 
 
If the State tax agency disallows Healthco’s tax treatment of the CFO plan 
(that is, the State tax agency contends that the amount of pre-trigger 
employee claims “paid” by employers should be included in gross premiums 
“received” by Healthco) and prevails, the Accuracy-related penalty of State 
Code § 101 equal to 20% of the resultant additional tax owing would apply 
unless Healthco can establish “reasonable cause” and “good faith” with 
respect to the CFO plan. 
 
To establish “reasonable cause” and “good faith”, Healthco can point to 
reliance on the written opinion of a tax professional stating that there is at 
least a 50-percent likelihood that the CFO plan will be upheld by a court if 
challenged by the State tax agency. State Reg. § 1.101-1. Healthco wishes for 
you to provide such a written opinion and offers to pay you a fee for doing so 
equal to three times the total fees you have earned each year for providing 
advice to Healthco (that is, the fee would equal approximately 6% of your 
firm’s annual revenues). 
 
State Code § 102 provides that a tax professional who provides such a written 
opinion when a reasonable tax professional would conclude that the likelihood 
that the taxpayer’s tax treatment will be upheld by a court if challenged by 
the State tax agency is NOT at least 50 percent shall pay a penalty in the 
amount of three times the fee obtained for such opinion [$250 for participants 
in “low” penalty condition]. 
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State Code § 102 further provides that “said penalty must be paid from the 
personal assets of the tax professional and may not be reimbursed directly or 
indirectly by an insurance company or any other party”. 
 
Please answer the following question: 
 
Given the information provided, please indicate how likely it is that pursuant 
to Healthco’s request you would provide a written opinion stating that if the 
State tax agency disallows Healthco’s tax treatment of the CFO plan (that is, 
the State tax agency contends that the amount of pre-trigger employee claims 
“paid” by employers should be included in gross premiums “received” by 
Healthco) there is at least a 50-percent likelihood that Healthco's tax 
treatment of the CFO plan will be upheld by a court. 
 
Indicate the degree of likelihood of providing a written opinion by making a 
selection on the scale below.  
please choose one  
 
Now I will ask you some questions to better understand your decision about 
Healthco.  
1. What is the amount of the State Code § 102 penalty potentially applicable 
to tax professionals who provide an improper written opinion? 
select one
 
 
 
2. a. Did the relevant State statutes include the following provision? 
 
Gross premiums received by insurance companies represent the entire 
consideration paid by (or on behalf of) an insured for insurance coverage. 
This generally includes the total cost of the insurance coverage provided 
to 
the insured.  
 
select one
 
 
b. If yes, do you agree that the CFO plan complied with the provision? 
 
select one
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3. a. Did the relevant State statutes include the following provision? 
 
Items included in employee group health insurance premiums. —Gross 
premiums received by an insurance company with respect to an employee 
group health insurance policy include (but are not limited to) — 
 
(A) If an employer self insures with respect to a portion of its group health 
insurance obligation to employees, but the insurance company is obligated to 
pay all employee claim payments each period once aggregate employee claim 
payments exceed a trigger amount that is less than 75% of the actuarially 
predicted average aggregate employee claim payments for that 
period, then “gross premiums received” by the insurance company shall 
include the sum of: (1) 100% of the actuarially predicted average aggregate 
employee claim payments, and (2) loading (including a charge for assuming 
the risk that aggregate employee claim payments will exceed the expected 
level, administrative costs, the gross premiums tax and the cost of capital).  
select one
 
 
 
b. If yes, do you agree that the CFO plan complied with the provision? 
 
select one
 
 
 
4. How likely is it that Healthco would prevail in legal proceedings against the 
State tax agency with respect to the CFO plan? 
 
select one
 
 
 
5. If Healthco did engage in the CFO plan, what is the chance that Healthco’s 
State Gross Premiums Tax returns will be audited by the State tax agency?  
 
select one
 
 
 
6. Assume that Healthco has engaged in the CFO plan. What is the chance 
that the tax professional penalty of State Code § 102 would be held applicable 
if a tax professional provides a written opinion? 
 
select one
 
 
 
7. How realistic were the study materials and task?  
 
select one
 
 
 
8. I believe it is important that tax professionals encourage taxpayers to pay 
the least amount of taxes possible. 
 
select one
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9. I believe it is important that tax professionals always interpret 
unclear/ambiguous laws in favor of taxpayers.  
 
select one
 
 
 
10. Have you ever encountered a state gross premiums tax in your practice?  
 
select one
 
 
If yes, how may times?  
 
If yes, briefly describe your experience with the gross premiums tax. 
 
 
 
11. Which of the following degrees do you hold (indicate all that apply)?  
 
Bachelors Type:   
 
Masters Type:  
 
Doctorate Type:  
 
 
12. How many tax courses have you have taken in college?  
 
 
13. Indicate the length of time you have worked in each of the following 
fields:  
 
(years) in Auditing  
 
(years) in Tax  
 
(years) in other Accounting  
 
 
14. Which of the following best describes your current position: 
 
Sole practitioner, owner  
 
Sole practitioner, employee  
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Small Firm (2-10 owners)  
 
Medium Firm (10-50 owners)  
 
Large Firm (over 50 owners), Not Big Four  
 
Big Four  
 
Corporation, Fortune 500  
 
Other corporation or partnership  
 
Gov’t -- U.S.  
 
Gov’t -- state, county or city 
Not for profit organization  
 
Other 
 
 
15. Which of the following best describes your current area of practice? 
 
Audit  
 
Tax Compliance  
 
Tax Planning  
Cost 
 
Other  
 
16. Your gender:? 
select one
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17. For each of the following statements, select "T" if you agree that the 
statement is a true description of you. If you disagree and feel the statement 
falsely describes you, then select "F". Please select one of the letters for each 
statement even if you are somewhat unsure. 
 
a. People have told me I seem to enjoy taking chances. 
select one
 
 
b. When I want something, I’ll sometimes go out on a limb to get it. 
select one
 
 
c. I consider security an important element in every aspect of my life. 
select one
 
 
d. I rarely, if ever, take risks when there is another alternative. 
select one
 
 
e. In games I usually "go for broke" rather than playing it safe. 
select one
 
 
f. I try to avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes. 
select one
 
 
g. Taking risks does not bother me if the gains involved are high. 
select one
 
 
h. I would prefer a stable position with a moderate salary to one with a higher 
salary but less security. 
select one
 
 
i. The thought of investing in stocks excites me. 
select one
 
 
j. I would participate only in business undertakings that are relativelycertain. 
select one
 
 
k. I would enjoy bluffing my way into an exclusive club or private party. 
select one
 
 
l. If the possible reward was very high, I would not hesitate putting my money 
into a new business that could fail. 
select one
 
 
m. I rarely even make small bets. 
select one
 
 
n. If I invested any money in stocks, it would probably only be in safe stocks 
from large, well-known companies. 
select one
 
 
o. I enjoy taking risks. 
select one
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p. When in school, I rarely took the chance of bluffing my way through an 
assignment. 
select one
 
 
q. I would enjoy the challenge of a project that could mean either a promotion 
or loss of a job. 
select one
 
 
r. Skin diving in the ocean would be much too dangerous for me. 
select one
 
s. I think I would enjoy almost any type of gambling. 
select one
 
 
t. I probably would not take the chance of borrowing money for a business 
deal even if it might be profitable. 
select one
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Appendix B 
 
Institutional Review Board Permission 
